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Abstract 
 
 This paper examines the Bracero Program and its implementation from the start of World 
War II to the end of the program in 1964. Farmers and planters in America needed a sufficient 
labor supply once the war started, and Mexico became the main supplier. The Bracero Program 
was initiated as a war effort and meant to only last until the end of the war, but the planter elite 
had far different intentions once they realized how productive and inexpensive the program 
could be. This paper identifies the leading causes for how the Bracero Program was able to last 
over twenty years. 
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Introduction: A Reason for Bracero Labor and its Implications 
 
 
 
At the height of the Great Depression the national unemployment rate hovered around 
twenty-five percent. The economic catastrophe crippled the industrial economy and caused 
immense hardship all across the country. The supply of unskilled workers in the United States 
was plentiful; employers all across the country could find labor to harvest their crops. The Great 
Depression gave credence to the old adage “one man’s loss is another man’s profit,” at least for 
farmers and planters. In the late 1930s, the threat from an increasing conflict in Europe created a 
sudden war mobilization. This mobilization opened job markets and helped shrink 
unemployment. With the United States bracing and preparing for conflict, the industrial economy 
began to hire more and more labor. During World War II, American men, black and white, 
devoted their lives to the defense of American values and freedom. Once the conflict began, a 
labor shortage developed, especially in the agricultural South. The demand for industrial workers 
in northern cities, such as Chicago, Detroit, and Pittsburg, exacerbated the labor shortage. The 
industrial labor demand initiated a massive rural to urban migration, particularly on the part of 
southern African Americans who had been the main labor source for planters and farmers. The 
solution adopted by the United States government was to work with the Mexican government to 
recruit Mexican laborers into specific areas of the country.1 This will examine how American 
farmers and planters used their influence over politicians to extend the Bracero Program beyond 
World War II. 
																																																						
1 Jeannie Whayne, A New Plantation South: Land, Labor, and Federal Favor in Twentieth-
century Arkansas (Charlottesville, Va : University Press of Virginia, 1996), pg. x 
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When the United States officially entered World War II, the governments of Mexico and 
the United States engineered a program for the “importation and employment of “braceros,” 
literally “arms,” and the Hispanic equivalent of the Anglo word “hand,” meaning a laborer 
available for hire.”2 The United States Immigration Service (USIS) was responsible for 
coordinating with the Mexican government. The USIS worked hand in hand with farmers in the 
United States and coordinated with the Mexican government by allowing Mexico to select the 
workers on a term-by term -basis. Each contract was based on where, when, and what type of 
labor was needed. This initiative became known as the Bracero Program.  
 
“The agreement stated (United States Executive Agreement series 278, 1943:3) 1. 
Mexican Laborers shall not be subject to the military draft. 2. Discrimination 
against braceros is forbidden. 3. They shall be guaranteed transportation, food, 
hospitalization and repatriation. 4. They shall not be used to displace other 
workers nor to lower wages. 5. Contracts made by employee and employer will be 
made under the supervision of the Mexican government and shall be written in 
Spanish. 6. Expenses incurred for transportation and lodgings from point of origin 
to destination shall be paid by the employer who will be reimbursed by sub-
employer. With regard to word and salary, the principal points were: 1. Salaries 
shall be the same as those made to citizens of the U.S.A and shall not be lower 
than 30 cents an hour. 2. Exceptions as to wages can be made under extenuating 
circumstances provided authorization by the Mexican government is given. 3. No 
minors under 14 will be allowed to work. 4. Braceros will be allowed to form 
associations and elect a leader to represent them. 5. They shall be guaranteed 
work for 75 percent of the working days. 6. Savings shall be deducted from their 
pay and Banco Nacional Agricola shall take charge of the money until the 
braceros return.”3 
 
 
 
																																																						
2 Ernesto Galarza, Merchants of Labor: The Mexican Bracero Story, 1942-1960 (San Jose, CA: 
The Rosicrucian Press 1964), pg. 10 
3 Maria Herrera-Sobek, The Bracero Experience: Elitelore versus Folklore (Los Angeles, CA: 
UCLA Latin American Center Publications 1979), pg. xiii 
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 The 1942 agreement between the United States and Mexico was beneficial for both 
countries. In the United States farmers were able to request Mexican labor for a designated 
amount of time by submitting applications to the government. This allowed them to fill their 
labor needs without hiring in the fall and firing workers once the harvest was completed. The 
Bracero Program also gave American farmers the ability to negotiate their labor needs without 
worrying about the demands of labor unions, and it made it much more profitable to hire 
temporary workers compared to domestic workers. Domestic workers needed year-round 
employment and in the capital-intensive environment of post-war agriculture, year-round labor 
was no longer necessary. Once American farmers realized the economic benefits of renting labor 
from Mexico, it became a full-fledged agricultural industry. For Mexico, the Bracero Program 
provided the opportunity to assist in the war effort. It also gave Mexican labor an opportunity to 
work for a higher wage, some of which made its way back to the Mexican economy. 
 Under the Bracero Program a farmer requested, through the United States Agricultural 
Extension Agency, a certain number of temporary workers. The American farmer would have to 
agree to the duration of the contract, the pay rate, and the type of work to be done. Once the 
contracts were signed by all parties, the process of transporting the braceros to the farms would 
begin. To ease the cost for farmers, the United States insisted that the bracero processing centers 
be located near the border between Mexico and the United States. The two border checkpoints 
used by Arkansas farmers were located in Hidalgo and Brownsville, Texas. Once the contacts 
were complete, it was the responsibility of the farmer to pay for transportation costs back to the 
border checkpoints. Unfortunately, this placed the cost of transportation to these border locations 
completely on the laborer. Upon arrival at the border processing centers, the braceros would be 
subject to a rigorous screening process. For example, “at the US labor reception center, the 
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worker and his luggage are thoroughly dusted with DDT powder as a sanitary measure and to 
prevent insects from being brought into the US.”4 The laborer was then subject to an x-ray and a 
photograph then it was attached to the individual’s passport. After these processes were 
complete, the braceros were ready to be transported, and planters fulfilled that part of their 
bargain.  Unfortunately, many of the vehicles were substandard and overcrowding was the norm. 
In fact, “the transportation resulted in the largest number of accidents and safety violations they 
experienced.”5 Once they arrived at their work sites, it was very difficult for the bracero to 
complain or voice his concerns over any type of issue. In many cases, the braceros were 
expendable, because “the threat of returning a contractee to Mexico if he did not meet the 
demands of the job without complaint was usually enough for workers to conform to grower 
expectations.”6 This made it very difficult for the braceros to affect any type of change if they 
felt their situation was unfair. The threat of deportation prevented most protests and made it easy 
for planters to disregard any type of bracero protest that did arise. In other words, “growers could 
rely on fear rather than violence to keep workers in line.”7 Also, while working in the United 
States braceros were consigned to labor camps where they were separated from the rest of 
American society. This was designed to allow planters to monitor their whereabouts at all times 
and to segregate the braceros from domestic workers and the public. Once the braceros 
completed their contracts, it was the responsibility of the planter to return the bracero back to 
Mexico.  
																																																						
4 Ronald Mize and Alicia Swords, Consuming Mexican Labor: From the Bracero Program to 
NAFTA (Toronto, Ontario, Canada: University of Toronto Press 2011), pg. 10 
5 Ibid., pg. 14 
6 Ibid., pg. 15 
7 Ibid. 
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The Bracero Program continued after World War II and operated for a total of twenty-
two years.  The program brought more than four million temporary Mexican workers to the 
United States.8 The program had tremendous implications within the agriculture sector of the 
United States, in particular the Arkansas Delta. This study examines how Arkansas planters 
mobilized their political and economic influence over Arkansas politicians to support the 
advancement of the Bracero Program and limit the power held by local labor. Most studies in 
U.S. agricultural history focus on African American labor, the impact slavery had on agriculture, 
or general agricultural shifts, especially once slavery ended. However, this research focuses on a 
different category of agricultural labor. This thesis uses primary documents and secondary 
sources to understand why farmers, the United States, and Mexico worked together to implement 
the Bracero Program. The sources will shed light on how and why it was utilized by large 
planters and landowners, in particular Arkansas plantation owner, Lee Wilson. 
This research addresses key issues that surrounded the Bracero Program, specifically in 
Arkansas, and its impact on the local community, in particular the local labor. More importantly, 
it addresses why plantations, such as that operated Lee Wilson & Company, were determined to 
rely on the Bracero Program for its labor force and began using their influence over government 
officials, such as Senator J. William Fulbright and Governor Orval Faubus, to gain a more 
favorable outcome. Another vital issue this research examines is the effect mechanization and 
industrialization had on the implementation of the program and why it was favorable for planters 
to use their economic power to influence political elites into adopting the program, especially in 
regards to large plantations, such as Lee Wilson & Company. 
																																																						
8	Justin Castro,	“Mexican Braceros and Arkansas Cotton: Agricultural Labor and Civil Rights in 
the Post-World War II South,”	Arkansas	Historical	Quarterly	LXXV	(Spring	2016),	pg.	27-46.	
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Chapter One: Bracero Program Historiography 
The historiography centered around the Bracero Program has taken several different 
approaches. Scholars have focused on planters influencing the political establishment to adopt 
the Bracero Program and they have highlighted the attitude of local labor toward the program 
and how the political elite neglected their discontent in favor of the planters’ economic agenda. 
Along with understanding the impact on the local labor force, this research explores why and 
how plantation owners took advantage of the Bracero Program. The program was implemented 
in 1942 as a war measure, it benefitted farmers all across the agricultural United States, and it 
became evident that it was important, economically, for both the government and planters, to 
sustain a productive output during the war. However, the program survived long past the 
declaration of peace and was not disbanded until 1964. The Bracero Program survived after 
World War II because it could supply a sustained and cheap labor force for American planters. 
The following sources have been arranged from oldest to newest publication, and are not 
arranged according to content. Each will shed light on how and why the program was utilized by 
large planters and landowners.  
The Bracero Program was utilized throughout the United States, especially, and most 
significantly in California where seasonal workers were an essential component of agriculture. 
California’s enormous and varied food productions dictated its participation in attracting bracero 
labor from Mexico. The oldest scholarship relating to the Bracero Program in California is by 
Ernesto Galarza, Merchants of Labor: The Mexican Bracero Story: An Account of the Managed 
Farm Workers in California 1942-1960. Galarza highlights the background of Californian and 
Mexican societies.  As the preface, by U.S. Senator from Alaska Ernest Gruening, makes clear 
California dealt with massive political corruption and pressure from wealthy planters. Planters 
7	
	
used their influence over politicians to maintain the program long after the war. First, Galarza 
chronicles the need for agricultural labor during World War II as the main reason California 
planters turned to bracero labor. Coupled with an inability to find and secure sufficient labor, and 
the fear of an actual shortage of food during the war the United States government negotiated 
labor bonds with the Mexican government. The United States wanted Mexico to provide 
transportation costs for the braceros from their homes to the border checkpoints. Mexico wanted 
the United States to provide the transportation costs for the braceros from the border checkpoints 
to the farms, and then back to the border checkpoint once their contracts were completed. The 
government supplied planters in California with braceros from contracting centers over eight 
hundred miles away, and had them on the farms in just forty-eight hours. Galarza claims the 
ability of the government to supply California planters with Mexican labor was a major factor in 
allowing the Bracero Program to flourish. “In California the hinge of an enormous input of more 
than 500,000,000 man-hours to raise 33,000,000 tons of agricultural products was the bracero 
labor force, which in 1957 numbered over 100,000.”9  
The railroads and the agricultural sector needed laborers with different skills; regardless, 
according to Galarza, the qualifications held by braceros were appreciated by major railroad 
companies and commercial farmers all across the American south. According the Galarza, the 
railroad companies considered braceros to be very hard workers, and they were well versed in 
railroad construction since Mexico had a budding railroad industry at the time of the program. 
Galarza claims planters desired braceros because they could be hired easily through government 
channels, they could be counted upon to appear to work on schedule, contracts could be made 
without negotiating with labor unions, and the individual contract could be overseen by the 
																																																						
9 Galarza, Merchants of Labor, pg. 15 
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planter. Another major issue that Galarza highlights is the ability of the Bracero Program to 
reduce the social cost of unemployment since it allowed the planter to send the braceros back to 
Mexico when they were no longer needed. It is clear that planters and landowners held influence 
and power over the political processes, and Galarza claims the United States government tipped 
the scales farther in the favor of property owners and agribusiness. Galarza argues this resulted in 
an implementation of an administered democracy because the laborer had a choice to become a 
bracero, but once he became a bracero he was not able to make his own choices, in regards to the 
type of labor he performed. It also further exposed the bracero labor force because it helped 
planters dictate contractual agreements once the braceros were on the farms. At the end, Galarza 
reflects on how the Bracero Program affected the bracero home communities and the 
communities they entered. The braceros were under constant surveillance, and in some cases, the 
planters were fearful enough of absconded braceros that they surrounded the labor camps with 
barbed wire. Galarza explains that these barbwire camps were constructed primarily for symbolic 
purposes, and unfortunately, “a more effective barrier surrounded them- the social justice created 
by difference in language, customs and familiar patterns of character and behavior,”10 which 
meant no matter how hard the braceros worked they would never be viewed or considered equal 
by Americans. 
In Bracero Experience: Elitelore Versus Folklore, Maria Herrera-Sobek enhances our 
understanding of bracero life by balancing the interplay between elitelore and folklore and using 
oral histories to advance the Bracero Program methodology. Unlike Galarza, Herrera-Sobek does 
not examine or even hint at the corrupt politicians who used their power to benefit the planter 
elite in the United States. By using tape-recorded interviews and firsthand accounts of the 
																																																						
10 Ibid. 
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experience of braceros, she is able to create a compelling portrait of conditions on American 
farms. She also observes that the literary elite in Mexico did not participate in the Bracero 
Program, and this fact, created a negative explanation of bracero experiences in the United 
States. Herrera-Sobek explains that the lack of understanding and relationship between elite 
Mexican novelists and braceros made the bracero experience become an embarrassment to the 
intellectual historians of Mexico. In many instances, elite Mexican novelists portrayed the 
returning bracero as a bitter and broken man. “Although Mexico’s novelists thought that they 
were right in protecting Mexico from the loss of some of its best labor, in reality they tended 
indirectly to help convince the bracero of his inferiority.”11 In effect, the novelists and 
intellectuals were using their power and influence to criticize the Bracero Program, and felt it 
was necessary to discredit and demean the impact of the braceros in Mexican history.  
Herrera-Sobek’s decision to select differing villages with varying socioeconomic 
characteristics in Mexico allowed her to create a composite story of the bracero experience. 
Herrera-Sobek does not place one hundred percent of the blame for the negative impact of the 
Bracero Program in Mexican history on the Mexican elite. She places a majority of the blame on 
the United States agricultural regions that requested foreign labor for their farms and subjugated 
them to demeaning treatment and racist attitudes. However, in many accounts, the braceros she 
interviewed were “either oblivious to prejudice that the Anglo-Saxon segment of the U.S. 
population might have directed at them or unconsciously repressed the idea altogether.”12 She 
makes it clear braceros were more interested in the possibility of bettering their lives through low 
wages in the United States over low wages in their native Mexican villages. According to the 
																																																						
11 Herrera-Sobek, The Bracero Experience, pg. 2 
12 Ibid., pg. 127 
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braceros, the decision was made because even low wages in the United States equaled to a high 
exchange rate once they returned to Mexico. For example, “the rate of exchange was 12.50 pesos 
to 1 dollar,” and one bracero told her “as long as Mexican workers come home with radios, cars, 
clothing, and dollars, there will be a constant stream of them trekking to the United States.”13 
Herrera-Sobek concludes her research with the realization that Mexican workers will always 
look to the United States as a land of economic prosperity, especially compared to their native 
land. Herrera-Sobek’s outlook seems to have become a reality. “Until Mexico can provide 
adequate employment for its jobless, its destitute campesinos, braceros will continue to be part of 
the United States-Mexican scene whether in the form of “wetbacks” or “wire jumpers.”14 
 The Tracks North: The Railroad Bracero Program of World War II, by Barbara Driscoll, 
separates itself significantly from the research by Herrera-Sobek, but it does resemble the 
research completed by Galarza. While Galarza focuses mainly on the labor in California, in 
which both railroad and agricultural labor are examined, he still devotes the majority of his book 
to addressing the role braceros played in the California agricultural labor force. The Tracks 
North: The Railroad Bracero Program of World War II, by Barbara Driscoll, documents the 
factors and negotiations that created the Bracero Program, specifically in the railroad industry, 
and highlights the “remarkable fact that this short-lived program remains the only binational 
migration agreement between Mexico and the United States that both parties respected in its 
original form.”15 Driscoll makes it clear the railroad industry was not as influential or successful 
as the agricultural industry, especially in maintaining the Bracero Program, however, Driscoll 
																																																						
13 Ibid., pg. 128 
14 Ibid. 
15 Barbara A. Driscoll, The Tracks North: The Railroad Bracero Program of World War II 
(Austin, TX: University of Texas 1999), pg. xiii 
11	
	
does point out the braceros’ contribution to the railroad system “represents a singular and 
pivotal, albeit largely unknown, chapter of Mexican immigration to the United States.”16 The 
railroad companies were not building new lines, but they did need constant maintenance, and the 
braceros held important work experience that benefitted the railroad companies.  
Although, the railroad industry only utilized the Bracero Program from 1943 to 1945, it 
employed over 100,000 Mexican workers at more than thirty different railroad sites.17 Driscoll 
says railroad employers were just as pleased as the planters were over the work ethic of the 
braceros and the ease with which they could be hired. According to Driscoll, the major 
difference between the Bracero Program in the railroad industry and the agricultural industry was 
the control held by powerful railroad unions. As he puts it, “the railroad bracero program was 
implemented in spite of the presence of large and powerful railroad unions in Mexico and United 
States.”18 Fortunately, for domestic workers, the railroad unions were able to use their influence 
over the United States government to end the Bracero Program- as far as railroads were 
concerned- once the war emergency was over. Driscoll states, “in spite of efforts of the railroads 
and some U.S. bureaucrats to extend the railroad program beyond the war, for example, the 
brotherhoods had merely to remind the United States government that the negotiations had 
limited it to the war emergency.”19  
This analysis provides a stark difference between the power and influence held by 
domestic railroad workers compared to the lack of power and influence domestic agricultural 
workers held over the United States government, and it highlights the tremendous influence 
																																																						
16 Ibid., pg. ix 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid. 
19 Ibid., pg. 168 
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unions had with government officials. If the domestic agricultural workers would have been able 
to unionize they could have used their power to combat the power held by planter elites, thus 
decreasing the planters’ ability to hire Mexican labor through the Bracero Program. Driscoll 
claims the railroad portion of the Bracero Program “stands out as the only successful binational 
immigration project implemented by the U.S. and Mexican governments,”20 because it is the 
only instance where the Mexican government was able to negotiate significant results that would 
protect Mexican laborers. In regards to the agricultural Bracero Program, Driscoll highlights the 
measures planters made to supply labor in their fields before the program was implemented. In 
many cases planters, especially in predominately agricultural states, recruited workers from 
outside the agricultural labor force. Unfortunately, even whole communities stopping their usual 
activities to work in the fields did not prove to be a sufficient solution for planters.  
In Guest Workers or Colonized Labor?: Mexican Labor Migration to the United States, 
by Gilbert Gonzalez, the focus is on how Mexico has been prized and exploited by the United 
States for its natural resources, and most of all its cheap labor. According to Gonzalez, the 
international relationship the United States has with Mexico “bears the imprints of imperialist 
domination.”21 Gonzalez uses this idea to identify the social consequences of imperialist 
domination, particularly the mass uprooting of migrated labor from Mexico to the United States. 
Gonzalez claims most historians have been reluctant to compare the Bracero Program to an 
imperialist scheme because it can be described as a unique agreement between two sovereign 
nations. In Gonzalez’s opinion, the Bracero Program conforms to an “imperialist schema,”22 
																																																						
20 Ibid., pg. x 
21 Gilbert Gonzalez, Guest Workers or Colonized Labor: Mexican Labor Migration to the United 
States (Boulder, CO: Paradigm Publishers 2006), pg. 1 
22 Ibid., pg. 2 
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because it comprises a series of government measures designed to recruit and organize Mexican 
labor for purposes beneficial to the national interests of the United States. Gonzalez provides 
ample evidence to demonstrate his argument, and he claims the Bracero Program paralleled 
colonial labor practices used by Britain and France during the spread of colonialism. According 
to Gonzalez, under the auspices of the Bracero Program, Mexican workers were transported to 
the United States as indentured servants and systematically placed under planters’ control. Since 
they were placed under employer control, it was easy to segregate the workers from domestic 
labor and to deny them certain key labor rights, such as the right to organize into unions, the 
right to negotiate fair wages, the right to protest and the right or ability to change employers. 
Gonzalez says “little if any oversight enforced rights and privileges legally accorded to the 
laborers.”23 Another example Gonzalez highlights is the low standard of living afforded to the 
braceros. He claims, as other historians have pointed out, that braceros were subject to harsh 
working conditions and poor living situations while in the United States. He also points to how 
planters themselves held long standing imperialistic ideas toward their labor force. 
 Gonzalez focuses on the planters’ ability to blacklist Mexican workers with rebellious 
tendencies or lazy work performance as evidence of a commonly applied colonial practice. 
Gonzalez makes three major arguments to bolster his claim that the Bracero Program resembles a 
colonial practice. The economic relationship between Mexico and the United States, exhibits 
“the classic hallmarks of neocolonialism.”24  Gonzalez suggests American business owners 
dominated the Mexican economy by investing in mining, agriculture, banking and financing 
institutions, which strengthened the United States economic position over Mexico. He claims the 
																																																						
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid., pg. 3 
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Bracero Program was a variation of a migration pattern that had been happening for half a 
century. As he suggests, “migration here is explained through acknowledging the critical impact 
effected by U.S. imperialism upon the demography and social organization of the Mexican 
nation.”25 Gonzalez cites the work of Galarza when he claims the wages and working condition 
standards found in the United States did not compare to those in Mexico and presented Mexican 
labor with an opportunity to better their lives and enhance their economic livelihood. In other 
words, the low wages in the United States were considerable better than the highest wages 
available in Mexico. Finally, Gonzalez emphasizes and compares European migration with 
Mexican migration. He says it is not possible to use European migration as a “one size fits all”26 
because there is a significant cultural divide between Mexico and the United States. He argues 
that European immigrants had an easier time adjusting and assimilating in the United States, and 
in many cases were provoked to migrate to the United States for different reasons than Mexican 
immigrants. Gonzalez claims Mexico’s neocolonial status, in the eyes of the United States, “as 
the precondition for migration to the United States and for the subsequent Mexican immigrant 
experience within the United States.”27  
Overall, Gonzalez explores the result of United States economic influence over the 
migration of Mexican labor, specifically the Bracero Program, and how it was a “quintessential 
expression of imperialism.”28 Gonzalez believes examining the Bracero Program within the 
imperialist domination context allows historians to “engage more realistic explanations regarding 
the U.S.-Mexico relationship and its offspring- migration- and thereby establish valuable 
																																																						
25 Ibid., pg. 4 
26 Ibid., pg. 5 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ibid., pg. 11 
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approaches to the more important aspects of Chicano history.”29 Gonzalez sought to elucidate the 
conditions brought on by the Bracero Program, which he claims ripped apart the Mexican 
countryside and initiated widespread labor migrations. His analysis centered on how the program 
served the economic interests of American employers, and how the program integrated Mexican 
workers into the United States economy using imperial and colonial style tactics. “Using such an 
approach, we are bound to arrive at the conclusion that there is no such thing as a “good” guest 
worker program, inasmuch as all such programs depend upon the continual availability of 
uprooted people without options, refugees of an economic policy leading toward the 
recolonization of Latin America.”30  
Dr. Rocio Gomez, a professor of Latin American and environmental history at the 
University of Arkansas, explored the experience of braceros who worked in the Arkansas Delta. 
Gomez’s approach, which supports most of the recent historiography, differs from the 
mainstream Arkansas agricultural scholarship because she believes the impact of Bracero 
immigrants has been ignored “despite their presence and driving force of the cotton sector in the 
1950s.”31 Gomez’s research is based around the Bracero point of view, which differs greatly 
from the research this paper has focused on. Gomez painted a vivid picture of the tumultuous and 
rigorous process the Braceros had to endure on their journey from Mexico to the Arkansas Delta. 
Gomez used firsthand accounts of Braceros who explained the hardships they faced while 
working in the Arkansas Delta, the tremendous stress caused by the plantation owners and how 
they adjusted to things like the climate and the new types of land/crops they were cultivating. 
																																																						
29 Ibid.  
30 Ibid., pg. 221 
31 Gomez, Rocio, “Braceros in the Arkansas Delta, 1943–1964,” Ozark Historical Review 39 
(Spring 2010): 1–18 
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Gomez also focuses on the Braceros who decided to stay in the United States once their work-
visas ended and how they accomplished the act of staying in the United States. Gomez also 
points to the implications mechanization and industrialization had on ending the Bracero 
program in the Arkansas Delta.  
The role mechanization and industrialization played on the Bracero Program in Arkansas 
can also be highlighted through the work of Jeannie Whayne. Whayne’s most recent book, titled 
Delta Empire: Lee Wilson and the Transformation of Agriculture in the New South, provides a 
significant source of information on why plantation owners, such as Lee Wilson took advantage 
of the Bracero labor. Whayne argues that planters, like Lee Wilson, turned to bracero labor 
because the transition to capital-intensive agriculture led to the “erosion of the tenancy and 
sharecropping system which insured a virtual depopulation of the rural countryside.”32 This 
argument serves as a vital point for this research because it shapes the backdrop of the Great 
Migration. Whayne also argues, however, that the Bracero Program gave planters more control 
over labor and, particularly, the wage rate. She cites testimony to a presidential Commission on 
Migratory Labor, which held hearings from July 31st to September 16th 1950, that said there was 
plenty of domestic labor available. The commission agreed, recommending to the president that 
“Further efforts should be directed toward supplying agricultural labor needs with our own 
workers and eliminating dependence on foreign labor.”33 Congress ignored the advice of the 
commission, however, and the Bracero Program expanded.  
Whayne’s research provides important insight into why and what caused planters to adopt 
bracero labor, along with the influence their economic prosperity had over local politicians. The 
																																																						
32 Jeannie Whayne, Delta Empire: Lee Wilson and the Transformation of Agriculture in the New 
South (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Press 2011), pg. 219 
33 Ibid. 
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cotton plantation was undergoing a fundamental reorganization, one that began during the New 
Deal.  During the first phase of this transition, the Agricultural Adjustment Administration paid 
farmers and planters to limit the production of certain crops – like cotton – and inadvertently 
created a labor surplus.  Planters ceased planting up to 25 percent of their acreage in cotton and 
many resorted to evicted tenants and sharecroppers because they no longer needed their 
labor.  The second phase of the transition began with World War II when a labor scarcity 
emerged.  Many landless farmers enlisted or were drafted into the armed services and others 
went to work in the defense industry.  The bracero program came into existence in order to 
address that labor shortage.  As Whayne shows, few braceros were used in the Arkansas delta, 
however, as sufficient prisoner-of-war labor existed.  The third phase of the transition began after 
World War II.  It was during the war that the first mechanical cotton harvester came off an 
assembly line and planters began to adopt their use in the post-war period.  Planters once again 
needed labor but many of the men who went off to war or to work in war industries did not 
return to rural areas.  Many others did return, however, and that became a point of contention 
when planters urged the continuation of the Bracero program in order to fill their labor 
needs.  The native laborers expected a certain guarantee of year-round labor rather than seasonal 
labor planters were becoming accustomed to in order to harvest their crops.  Another facet of this 
third phase was increasing use of weed-killing chemicals.  This greatly curtailed – and ultimately 
eliminated – the need for chopping cotton to rid the fields of weed during the summer.  Now 
planters needed labor only a few weeks in the summer to chop the cotton and a few weeks in the 
fall to harvest it.  Under the old tenancy system they had found it necessary to keep a labor force 
year-round in order to provide sufficient hands for planting and harvesting season.  Under the 
modern system, they no longer had that need.  While some native labor remained in the 
18	
	
plantation areas, the Bracero Program provided an attractive alternative of laborers who could be 
closely monitored and paid a low wage without the threat of protest.34 
While Whayne focuses on the impact of the Bracero Program on agricultural workers in 
the Arkansas Delta and their role in providing labor during an important transition period 
between labor-intensive and capital intensive agriculture, Ronald Mize and Alicia Swords, in 
Consuming Mexican Labor: From the Bracero Program to NAFTA, examine another angle. 
Mize and Swords view the Bracero Program as a systematic exploitation of Mexican labor by the 
United States and place much of the blame on the United States government and the planters 
who failed to live up to the original contracts. They also observe that consumption and 
production in the United States are tied to Mexican migration. They examine how North 
America’s “consumption practices are shaping particular labor needs in terms of low-wage and 
marginalized conditions where Mexican immigrant workers are increasingly recruited to 
work.”35 Their central argument is that the economic relations between the United States, Canada 
and Mexico are “inextricably intertwined”36 because the consumption based economies are built 
on the labor of Mexicans. They explore how the social relations of production and consumption 
in the United States and Canada shape Mexican migration patterns and labor production. They 
use the time span from 1942 to the present day to “present these relations as constituting a triad 
that includes capital accumulation, labor exploitation, and consumption practices in the making 
of Mexican labor for North American consumption.”37 In regards to the Bracero Program, they 
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35 Mize and Swords, Consuming Mexican Labor, pg. xiii 
36 Ibid., pg. xvii 
37 Ibid., pg. xxvii 
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analyze the program and the post-war experiences of Mexican labor, and how each contributed 
to the United States economy’s reliance on Mexican labor.  
An essay by Julie Weise, “The Bracero Program: Mexican Workers in the Arkansas 
Delta, 1948-1964,” focuses on the Braceros and the actions they took to solidify and expand their 
benefits as workers. Weise highlights how Braceros used the Mexican governments’ agreement 
with the United States as a political bargaining chip with landowners. Weise argues that this 
bargaining chip allowed them to break down Jim Crow discrimination, and enabled them to 
succeed “in forcing farmers to reject overt anti-Mexican discrimination and to admit dark-
skinned foreigners into white establishments as early as 1948.”38 Weise’s essay is key to 
understanding the importance the Bracero Program had on the Arkansas Delta in terms of 
disrupting the Jim Crow mentality, since the program and its stipulations forced landowners to 
abandon Jim Crow habits or risk losing the benefits of the program. Weise’s conclusion, 
regarding the power and influence landowners held over economic issues, shows the braceros 
“eluded the rigid structures of Jim Crow, but did not escape the economic, social, and cultural 
caste system it had created.”39 
Weise’s Corazon de Dixie: Mexicans in the U.S. South since 1910 includes a discussion 
of the experiences of braceros in the Arkansas Delta, mainly focusing on the discrimination they 
faced. Weise emphasizes that racial tension consumed the Arkansas Delta, and she addresses 
instances where local whites treated the bracero workers as unequal and refused to allow entry to 
white establishments: “local authorities used every means at their disposal- law, culture, and 
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practice- to ensure Mexicans’ nominal access to the white public spaces and to defuse racially 
charged conflicts as they emerged.”40 This book provides a basis for race relations between local 
people and the braceros, especially in regards to how whites reacted to the influx of bracero 
labor. A major argument from Weise’s research is the differential treatment plantation owners 
gave towards the braceros. Wiese argues that the changes implemented by the United States 
government over local officials helped spur the beginning of the destruction of Jim Crow in the 
Arkansas Delta. Weise’s research emphasized the ways braceros successfully pressed their claim 
for fairness among local whites. She also focuses on how the braceros were awarded better 
treatment by the planters, who caved to demands by the braceros and the Mexican government 
for personal injury insurance.  
 Another book that analyzes the Bracero Program is Defiant Braceros: How Migrant 
Workers Fought for Racial, Sexual & Political Freedom, by Mireya Loza. The main argument in 
this book traces the experiences of the Bracero Program through the eyes of the braceros. Loza 
claims this approach’s complexities have been overlooked by countless historians. She uses 
memory, race, sexuality and state power to critically examine the “material experiences of 
braceros and the discursive power the guest-worker program has wielded.”41 Loza uses bracero 
memories to “reveal contradictions within U.S. immigration policy that renders Mexican labor as 
necessary and Mexican settlement as unnecessary and unwarranted.”42 Loza determines that 
many former braceros have become strong critics of the Mexican nation-state. Loza says the 
memories collected from the former braceros “call attention to the dehumanizing nature of the 
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program and the Mexican state’s profiteering and complicity in creating a stateless class of 
workers primed for exploitation.”43 According to Loza, braceros were already feeling 
marginalized by the Mexican government before the Bracero Program started. Loza claims the 
bracero population had distinct racial and ethnic identities that “shaped how individuals 
understood their place in the racialized landscape of the United States and their relationships 
with other braceros.”44 She says this helps answer important questions concerning the racial and 
ethnic homogeneous of the bracero population. Loza places the braceros history at the center of 
her argument to show how the United States and the execution of the program “created and 
perpetuated a distinct racialized system when hiring Mexican migrants.”45 
 The most recent source that analyzes the Bracero Program is an article by Justin Castro 
titled, “Mexican Braceros and Arkansas Cotton: Agricultural Labor and Civil Rights in the Post-
World War II South.” In this article, Castro examines how Arkansas politicians, such as 
Congressman Took Gathings, used their political power to influence negotiations and the 
implementation of the Bracero Program. According to Castro, Gathings “ardently supported the 
bracero program but stood firmly against domestic policies that might include similar provisions 
for American workers.”46 Castro pulls evidence from the Gathings collection to show how he 
used his political power to help Arkansas farmers push the implementation of the Bracero 
Program. Castro also highlights how Gathings used his power to identify distinct differences 
between braceros and domestic labor. Castro uses Arkansas “to show how braceros and the 
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bracero program influenced the U.S. labor and civil rights movements.”47 He uses three very 
distinct situations to strengthen his argument. Castro claims braceros “complicated the black and 
white narrative surrounding labor and civil rights in the South.”48 This complication forced the 
United States to address the issue involving the Bracero Program and the rights of braceros in 
comparison to domestic workers. The Mexican government demanded social and economic 
protections for each bracero working in the United States, and these demands prompted “U.S. 
labor and civil rights activists to demand that the same standards and protections against 
discrimination be extended to American workers.”49  Once the standards and protections 
afforded to the braceros were realized “politicians and activists who promoted civil rights and 
better conditions for U.S. agricultural workers,”50 could use the program to call out hypocritical 
south Dixiecrats, such as Gathings..  
The secondary sources in this chapter give a broad understanding of the Bracero 
Program. Each source provides a different perspective surrounding the program and each helps 
the reader recognize how important the program was for American farmers and the braceros. 
These sources have supplied a great deal of information to this thesis because each source uses 
different research methods, different agricultural regions in the United States and highlights the 
importance of the Bracero Program in the United States and Mexico. The historiography 
surrounding the Bracero Program is consistent with this thesis because it can be concluded that 
politicians were always willing to be influenced by farmers and the planter elite. However, 
unlike the historiographies analyzed, this research contains a more extensive view of a very 
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distinct area and plantation that took part in the Bracero Program. The following chapter 
examines how a specific plantation, Lee Wilson & Company, in the Arkansas Delta utilized the 
Bracero Program and fought to keep it in existence.  
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Chapter Two: The Lee Wilson & Company Braceros 
In the Arkansas Delta, the most important time of the year is harvest time. Once the 
harvest begins, planters have a limited amount of time to secure the crop and thus produce the 
most profit from their crops. The need to realize a return on the investment was a driving factor 
in their pressure on politicians to secure the Bracero Program. On the other hand, changes to the 
program gave them a reason to voice their concerns once their economic returns were limited, 
especially after the 1949 bond agreement, which stated that the braceros were to be afforded 
individual health insurance for on and off the job site. It also stated that planters would be 
charged a fee for each bracero that was not safely returned to Mexico once their contracts were 
complete. The majority of planters voiced their concern because they felt the insurance was not 
necessary and they felt the fee charged was being unfairly applied to them. In many cases, 
planters placed the blame of costly financial penalties on the poor negotiations between the 
United States Immigration Service and the Mexican government. The information and data that 
follows analyzes how Lee Wilson & Company was affected financially and culturally by the 
Bracero Program.  
In the mid-twentieth century, the Arkansas Delta held enormous agricultural importance. 
The fertile soil, abundance of available water and the determination of landowners made it the 
epicenter of Arkansas agriculture. One of the most productive counties in the Arkansas Delta 
was Mississippi County. Located in the northeastern corner of the state and along the Mississippi 
River, it was the largest cotton producing county in the South at the height of cotton’s 
supremacy. The most important and wealthiest plantation in Mississippi County was operated by 
Lee Wilson & Company. At its height, Lee Wilson & Company included more than 65,000 acres 
of land and cultivated cotton, corn, alfalfa and soybeans.  The company even used its influence 
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to run and organize a town, famously named Wilson. The town of Wilson was the focal point of 
operations and included, cotton oil mills, a cooperage factory, a stave mill, a bank and other 
businesses. The company divided its farmlands into thirteen district units, each with its own 
general store and farm manager. The farm managers planted acreage in specific crops according 
to the dictates of the general farm manager who was housed in the headquarters in Wilson, but 
they had considerable authority over how farming activities were carried out on their units and, 
particularly, over the treatment of laborers.51 
Like other plantations in the mid-twentieth century, Lee Wilson & Company made the 
transition to capital-intensive farming and the Bracero Program figured prominently in their 
successful negotiation of the transition away from labor-intensive agriculture. Under the old 
tenancy system, they had expertly tied their laborers to them through debt and coercion in order 
to maintain a sufficient supply of labor. With labor needs declining steadily during the 1950s, 
they found it burdensome to keep native labor year-round and viewed it as economically 
expedient to turn to seasonal labor such as that offered through the Bracero Program. The Lee 
Wilson & Company experience with braceros was typical in many ways. Once Lee Wilson & 
Company paid the necessary fee to participate in the program, they were then allotted their 
temporary labor. The company provided transportation from the United States border centers to 
the plantations, typically packing laborers into open trucks, some of which had been used to haul 
cotton, and brought them back across Texas to Northeastern Arkansas. The company was also 
tasked with the safe return of the braceros once their contracts were complete. The Bracero 
Program became a very successful venture for Lee Wilson & Company, but by 1964 the 
																																																						
51	Whayne, Delta Empire, pg. x	
26	
	
transition to capital intensive agriculture was nearly complete and the company likely suffered 
little disruption once the Bracero Program ended.52 
While Lee Wilson & Company took advantage of the Bracero Program, they maintained 
high production rates, increased their wealth, and were able to limit the amount of money they 
paid to their laborers. However, hiring braceros through the Bracero Program did not allow Lee 
Wilson & Company to limit their pay to individual laborers. By law and according to contract 
agreements, the braceros were to be paid the same wage as domestic workers. However, 
domestic laborers had the ability to negotiate for higher wages, an impossibility for braceros. 
Even though “labor laws required a minimum wage of $.60 per hour for both domestic and 
foreign labor,” few braceros could press the point and “were often paid below that rate.” 53 
Fortunately for the braceros, the exchange rate from US dollar to Mexican peso made the lowest 
legal domestic wage quite favorable.  
The information used in this research was supplied by Jeannie Whayne, who secured the 
data from newly discovered files at the Lee Wilson & Company archives. Since this study began 
Dr. Whayne has secured information on additional bracero, indicating that a total of 2,224 
laborers were on the plantation in 1949. My analysis is based on the first 492 passport cards that 
were Dr. Whayne’s possession at the time my study was launched.   This represents 22.1 percent 
of the total number of braceros on the plantation, a sufficient sample for analysis. I entered the 
data into spreadsheets where the information could be accessed and analyzed using the Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences (SPSS).  The data set provides information on several important 
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issues.  First, it provides detail on the type of bracero planters and farmers preferred. Second, it 
also helps to understand the importance of bond insurance, since each bracero that abandoned 
their contract would, by law, cost the farmer a penalty fee.  Third, together with invoices from 
the USIS in the files, t provides crucial information on the 194 braceros who “abandoned their 
contract” in 1949. Although it cannot be certain that the latter were the only braceros who left the 
plantation without fulfilling their contracts, it probably reflects an accurate account of those who 
were apprehended. Since the company was responsible for returning all braceros assigned to 
them to Mexico once the contract was completed, they were charged fees by the USIS to cover 
the costs of transportation and incarceration of the fugitive invoices.  
At first glance, the number of braceros who abandoned their contracts seem 
extraordinarily high- 194 out of 492.  It is likely, however, that the USIS invoices and letters 
represent the total number of escaped braceros and should be considered as a percentage of the 
total number of braceros on the plantation, 194 out of 2,224. In other words, the 8.9 percent of 
the braceros on the plantation left without permission and were apprehended by authorities. As 
far as can be ascertained from a perusal of the published works on the program, no other record 
of abandoners from a single plantation is available, making this a unique window into the 
Bracero Program. The visa cards provide a wealth of detail: full names, the age of the braceros, 
distinguishing marks, specific origins in Mexico, place of border admission, and which farms the 
braceros worked on. The cards also provide information such as, which braceros were able to 
write. In many cases, if the bracero could not sign his own name a fingerprint was collected to 
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take the place of a signature. Taken together with the invoices from the Immigration Service, 
they provide an interesting portrait of the company’s experience using braceros.54 
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In regards to distinguishing marks, the United States government had several different 
ways of recording an individual braceros’ characteristics. When the bracero was being evaluated 
during the medical examination their distinguishing marks would be listed in numerous ways 
such as, pockmarked face, scar on left/right cheek, scar on forehead or scar on chin. This 
information illustrates how detailed and thorough the observation of each bracero was during the 
check-in process. Of the 437 braceros in our data set that we could match with the Master file, 
122 had distinguishing marks. The percentages and total number of braceros with distinguishing 
marks can be seen in the table below. 
Distinguishing Marks  
(does not include abandoners we could not match with Master file) 
 
Frequenc
y Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid NONE 315 .0 72.1 72.1 
Distinguishing 
marks 
122 .0 27.9 100.0 
Total 437 .0 100.0  
Missing System 0    
     
	
  
The process to become a bracero started once the Mexican government admitted the 
desired amount of men into the program. The terms of the Bracero Program stated that the 
Mexican government was obligated to pay the cost required to transport the laborers to the 
border checkpoints, which unfortunately fell to the braceros themselves since the Mexican 
government was unwilling to pay for the cost of transportation. At first, the Mexican government 
wanted the United States and the planter to pay the transportation cost, but once the planters 
voiced their disgust the United States demanded a different approach. The braceros secured 
transportation to border checkpoints and the planter was responsible for the transportation to the 
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ultimate destination. The admission checkpoints stretched along the American/Mexican border. 
The two admission centers that were used to admit the braceros hired by Lee Wilson & Company 
were located in Texas, one in Brownsville and the other in Hidalgo. Each checkpoint processed 
the braceros by completing their visa cards, ordering them into groups for transportation, and 
providing contract stipulations. While the braceros were awaiting transport the United States 
required each bracero to undergo a strict medical examination. During medical exams the 
braceros gave blood, received vaccinations, were checked for hemorrhoids, and sprayed with 
DDT. These medical examinations were crude and embarrassing for the braceros, and in many 
cases the doctors did not provide sufficient reasons for completing the examinations.55 The 
braceros had little experience with American doctors and this made them leery of the idea that 
strangers would be conducting such personal examinations. The total amount and percentages of 
where the Lee Wilson & Company braceros were admitted can be seen in the table below. This 
data does not provide significant detail for specific braceros, but it does show the distance these 
braceros had to travel once they were admitted for work at Lee Wilson & Company. 
 
Place of Admission, border  
(does not include abandoners we could not match with Master file) 
 
Frequenc
y Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Brownsville, 
Tx 
176 .0 40.3 40.3 
Hidalgo, Tx 261 .0 59.7 100.0 
Total 437 .0 100.0  
Missing System 0    
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Some inconvenient problems present themselves when analyzing the data. For some of 
the abandoners, the identification cards existed, either with the invoice or in the company 
records. As the tables below indicate, 55 of the 139 “abandoners” could be found on the Master 
List while 55 could not. The data set includes identification cards for 139 abandoners and 298 
braceros who fulfilled their contracts with Lee Wilson & Company. However, an additional 
problem exists. Some cards were incomplete since they did not have ages or did not indicate 
precisely which LW&C farm they had been assigned to. Since there were cards with incomplete 
information it is difficult to determine if there were more abandoned contracts other than the 
ones we could identify.  
 
 
Matched with Abandoners or not 
 
Frequenc
y Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Did not Abandon 
Contract 
298 .0 60.6 60.6 
Abandoner found on 
Master List 
139 .0 28.3 88.8 
Abandoner not found 
on Master List 
55 .0 11.2 100.0 
Total 492 .0 100.0  
Missing System 0    
  0   
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Matched Abandoned or Not 
 
Frequenc
y Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Abandoned Contract 194 .0 39.4 39.4 
Did not Abandon 
Contract 
298 .0 60.6 100.0 
Total 492 .0 100.0  
Missing System 0    
Total     
 
 
Some interesting observations can be made about the braceros who listed their age on the 
identification cards. They ranged in age from 16 to 57, but most of them were in the prime 
working ages. Fully 58.8 percent were aged from 21 to 30. The 16 to 20 and 31 to 40 age groups 
made up 17.4 percent and the oldest workers, from 41 to 57, represented only 6.4 percent of the 
company’s braceros on the data set listed below. When hiring braceros Lee Wilson & Company 
made it a priority to acquire workers who could benefit their company and thus they preferred 
those of prime working age and condition. This would allow the company to maintain high 
production outputs. Since the work Lee Wilson & Company needed accomplished was labor 
intensive and required extensive man hours, it became beneficial to have braceros who were in 
the prime of their lives. This meant it was in the company’s best interest to hire braceros who 
were relatively young, strong, and capable.  
There is not a definitive reason why over fifty percent of the braceros were aged from 21 
to 30, or why braceros aged 31 to 57 were less than twenty-five percent of the total number, 
however, it does leave room for speculation. In many cases the labor situation in Mexico and the 
financial incentive for becoming a bracero in the United States encouraged these men to offer 
their service to American planters. As for the individual age ranges it is not clear why one set of 
35	
	
ages were more likely to offer their services, but for the men aged 21 to 30 it could be speculated 
that these braceros had little standing in their way. It would have been more difficult for a 
bracero aged 31 to 57 to offer their services because of family obligations, a sense of pride, or a 
minimal need to explore new horizons. On the other hand, men aged from 31 to 57 may have 
decided to become braceros for the opposite reasons. It may have been more beneficial to their 
families for them to travel to the United States and work for higher wages. The higher wages 
being paid in the United States could be sent back to their family. This in turn would allow them 
to increase their family’s livelihood and standard of living. The driving factors for 16 to 30 
would have been less about family obligations, and more about their individual freedom, such as 
a need to explore new horizons. Equally, the prospect of traveling to the United States as a 
permanent destination could have fueled the intrigue for becoming a bracero. 
AGES RECODED 
 (does not include abandoners we could not match with Master file) 
 
Frequenc
y Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 16 TO 
20 
76 .0 17.4 17.4 
21 TO 
30 
257 .0 58.8 76.2 
31 TO 
40 
76 .0 17.4 93.6 
41 TO 
57 
28 .0 6.4 100.0 
Total 437 .0 100.0  
Missing System 0 0   
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 Another interesting picture that emerges from the analysis is the placement of braceros 
on particular farms run by the Lee Wilson & Company enterprise. The company had organized 
its vast holdings in separate units in order to maximize organizational control, expediency and 
production. As you will see from the table below, the information of the exact acreage in each 
farm unit is incomplete, but the largest farm units, other than the main Lee Wilson farm, seem to 
have been the Armorel and Keiser farms, which together were assigned 129 workers (30.7 
percent). Each farm utilized and supervised the labor as separate entities.  
 
Farm Assigned to  
(does not include abandoners we could not match with Master file) 
 Frequency Percent Valid Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Lee Wilson 192 .0 45.7 45.7 
Marie 3 .0 .7 46.4 
Keiser 68 .0 16.2 62.6 
Wren 31 .0 7.4 70.0 
Armorel 61 .0 14.5 84.5 
Morgan 7 .0 1.7 86.2 
Branch 9 .0 2.1 88.3 
Crain Bros 30 .0 7.1 95.5 
Exp Farm 8 .0 1.9 97.4 
Highland 3 .0 .7 98.1 
Hickory Lake 3 .0 .7 98.8 
Live Oak 5 .0 1.2 100.0 
Total 420 .0 100.0  
Missing System 0    
Total     
 
 
Our data set also analyzed which farms, 174 out of 194, braceros abandoned, and these 
results can be seen in the table below. Lee Wilson farm only had nine abandoned contracts, 
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which accounted for 5.2 percent of the total amount. Since Lee Wilson farm had the largest 
number of braceros hired, it raises the question, what made this percentage so low? It could have 
been that this farm had the best supervision, or the best working conditions. It is hard to 
determine, but either reason could explain the low number of abandoned contracts. However, the 
most reasonable explanation is that the farm unit labeled Lee Wilson exercised maximum control 
over its bracero labor. The conditions, the pay or the supervision must have been lacking at the 
other farm units. At the Marie farm the number of abandoned contracts was relatively high 
considering their number of total braceros. The Keiser farm was not much better. It too had a 
high proportion of abandoned contracts. On the Armorel farm the number of absconded braceros 
did not reach the percentages seen at Keiser or Marie, but it was still a sufficient amount to 
warrant speculation on why these farms witnessed abandoned contracts. At the Branch farm only 
a handful of braceros chose to abandon their contracts. The Crain Bro. farms must have been 
lacking in several categories because it had a large proportion of abandoned contracts. The 
Experiment farm had several skipped contracts, but accounted for a very small percentage of the 
total abandoned contracts. At Highland farm only 6 braceros skipped their contract. The Hickory 
Lake farm had 10 braceros abandon the farm. The Live Oak farm had 4 abandoned contracts. 
The Morgan farm had 2 abandoned contracts, the Greenwood farm had 3 and the Beall farm had 
4 abandoned contracts.  
Using the data set, it can be speculated that the farms with the highest percentage of 
abandoned contracts were the farms that had the worst working conditions, or more importantly, 
the least supervision. In regards to Lee Wilson & Company, the forces that prompted the 
braceros to abandon their contracts are difficult to determine through the data we have 
accumulated. However, it can be speculated that many of these farms were most likely located in 
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the most isolated rural areas where braceros felt comfortable maneuvering away from the farm. It 
can also be theorized that for some braceros the prospect of a job in the industrial centers of the 
United States, where better jobs and better paychecks were available, could have been a major 
driving force to abandon their contracts. After reviewing the data set, it is clear that several farm 
units within Lee Wilson & Company were more susceptible to abandoned contracts. Regardless 
of the reasons, if a bracero wanted to abandon his contract there was very little Lee Wilson & 
Company could do to stop him. 
Farm Abandoned 
 
Frequenc
y Percent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid Lee Wilson 9 .0 5.2 5.2 
Marie 33 .0 19.0 24.1 
Keiser 31 .0 17.8 42.0 
Armorel 21 .0 12.1 54.0 
Branch 5 .0 2.9 56.9 
Crain Bros 34 .0 19.5 76.4 
Exp Farm 12 .0 6.9 83.3 
Highland 6 .0 3.4 86.8 
Hickory 
Lake 
10 .0 5.7 92.5 
Live Oak 4 .0 2.3 94.8 
Morgan 2 .0 1.1 96.0 
Greenwood 3 .0 1.7 97.7 
Beall 4 .0 2.3 100.0 
Total 174 .0 100.0  
Missing 99 20 .0   
System     
Total     
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 Even with all the financial incentives brought on by the Bracero Program, Lee Wilson & 
Company still had a major complaint, especially once the work was complete. From the moment 
the braceros were under the planters’ supervision to the end of their contract the planter had 
complete control over the braceros’ whereabouts. This allowed planters to keep a close eye on 
their financial investments. When a braceros’ contract was fulfilled it was time for the planter to 
transport the bracero back to the border centers. This is where things could become economically 
complicated for the planter, and in many cases a financial burden, at least from the point of view 
of the planter. 
This chapter has analyzed an extensive collection of data. The data sets provide a great 
deal of information on where Lee Wilson & Company used bracero labor, what age of laborer 
they preferred, and how many braceros abandoned the agreed contracts. With the information 
accumulated from this data, it is clear Lee Wilson & Company viewed the Bracero Program as a 
productive and lucrative means of harvesting their crops. Even when contracts were abandoned 
and the company charged a fee, it was still beneficial for the company to hire labor through the 
program. The next chapter examines how Arkansas farmers and businesses, including Lee 
Wilson & Company, used their influence over politicians to extend the Bracero Program.  
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Chapter Three: The Benefits and Effects of the Bracero Program in Arkansas 
 
By highlighting the reasons Arkansas farmers shifted to Mexican labor, it becomes clear 
how and why they used their influence over government officials to sway the United States 
Immigration Service toward the Bracero Program. Since farmers were able to influence over 
legislative officials, they were able to benefit financially from the Bracero Program. The 
economic benefits associated with the program was great for farmers, however, in many 
instances the farmers became disgruntled with the United States government over the excessive 
expenses being accrued once the bracero contracts were ended. Many of these disgruntled 
farmers were upset with the way the United States had negotiated the labor bond of 1949. The 
first provision that upset the planters was the penalty they would have to pay if their braceros 
were not returned to the border checkpoints after their contracts were complete. In many cases, 
the planter would be charged a fifty-dollar penalty for every bracero that did not make it back to 
the checkpoint. In the minds of the planters, these charges were unfair, especially since they had 
no control over the braceros once they left the plantation. In several instances, planters blamed 
poor border patrol enforcement as the reasons braceros were more likely to skip their contracts. 
The second agreement that had planters complaining about the 1949 bond was the mandatory 
insurance policies they would have to provide for the braceros. Many planters felt the insurance 
agreement was beneficial for both camps, but only if they were allowed to use the appropriate 
local insurance agency.  
Although, much of this research highlights the ease with which planters were able to push 
the USIS and other political elites to adopt the Bracero Program, it also provides evidence to 
explain why domestic laborers were against the program altogether. Unfortunately, for local 
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labor, the influence planters had over political officials outweighed the influence they had over 
those same politicians. The political influence planters held over politicians that made them 
ignore much of what the common laborers of Arkansas felt was beneficial for their livelihoods 
can be seen in the following letters of this chapter. Overall, the research accumulated in this 
chapter helps to underscore why and how planters, especially Lee Wilson & Company, were able 
to use the Bracero Program to advance their economic interests and influence politicians to 
support the program. 
The following information has been collected from the University of Arkansas Special 
Collections archives. In these sources we will see how Arkansas planters voiced their 
appreciation, concerns, and frustrations with the Bracero Program. In many cases these planters, 
which include Lee Wilson & Company, wrote letters to local and federal politicians. In the 
letters the planters make it abundantly clear that political involvement in the program was greatly 
needed. The letters show how important the influence and economic power of planters had 
become.   
In a letter, dated July 13th 1950, Harvey Adams sent a report to the Agricultural Council 
of Arkansas, which was located in West Memphis, Arkansas, addressing the situation involving 
braceros who skip their contracts and cost the planters large amounts of cash. Harvey concluded 
in his report that the annual agricultural conference stated the USIS “showed thirty-five 
individuals or associates in Arkansas having 696 workers missing, which will cost Arkansas 
farmers $17,400.”56 This report provides evidence to why planters were willing to influence the 
																																																						
56 Harvey Adams to Senator William Fulbright, July 13th 1950 BCN 14 F24 5e, Immigration and 
Naturalization Service Problem of Return of Mexican Cotton Pickers. J. William Fulbright 
Papers, Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville (I was not able to 
view the entire box where this folder is located because it has been restricted due to sensitive 
information since the 1970s) 
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political elite when it came to how the Bracero Program was negotiated. If their bonds ended up 
costing the planters money, it was in their best interests to inform the United States government 
of these financial loses. 
 Another letter referencing the disapproval and overall concern regarding the poorly 
negotiated bond of 1949 was a letter from R.S. Barnett. In the letter, dated July 21st 1950, 
Barnett, the owner of the Elms Planting Company in Altheimer, Arkansas, voices his concern 
over the excessive bond requirements set by the USIS. Barnett explains to Senator J. William 
Fulbright that the requirements are unreasonable since “we have absolutely no control over these 
men from the time they leave the Mexican border until they return.”57 Barnett suggests that state 
and county law enforcement agencies be given the authority to keep the braceros on the jobs they 
were contracted. Barnett says “we certainly do not wish to keep these men against their will and 
are willing to return them at any time that they wish to go back to Mexico, but it seems 
unreasonable to expect us to make a bond guaranteeing their return to Mexico and then give 
them the privilege of going where they wish in this country, regardless of their contract.”58 
Barnett also blames the ease at which braceros were able to skip their contracts on the lackluster 
enforcement of the border by the USIS. John Erickson, Senator Fulbright’s assistant, wrote that 
Fulbright would urge others in the Senate to require that a new bond be negotiated.59 This letter 
provides evidence to support the fact that planters could use their political influence to impact 
legislation once it effected their economic prosperity. 
 Another piece of evidence that indicates planters were willing to use their political 
influence to produce change over the bond of 1949, also emanated from the Altheimer area. In a 
																																																						
57 R.S. Barnett to Senator William Fulbright, July 21st 1950, Fulbright Papers. 
58 Ibid. 
59	John Erickson to R.S. Barnett, July 27th 1950, Fulbright Papers.	
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letter, dated July 25th 1950, Charles Willey, the owner of Willey Planting Company, wrote to 
Senator Fulbright complaining about the bond agreement. Willey acknowledged that he 
complied with the requirements, but found it to be completely unfair. Willey stated “while we, 
who are for the most part financially responsible business men with established reputations in 
our communities, were under cash bond to return these men, they themselves were under no 
bond or obligation whatsoever to return to Mexico or to fulfill their contract.”60 Willey continues 
to highlight the failures of the bond agreement by explaining the process taken by the deserters. 
“A number of the workers merely used their contract as a passport into the United States and 
upon arriving at our farms immediately jumped their contract and migrated to other parts of the 
country.”61 He also says there was a marked increase in desertions once the workers neared the 
end of their contract. At the end of his letter Willey says “to require the farmer to make a bond 
guaranteeing the return of a man over whom he has no power of detention or arrest appears to me 
to be most unjust.”62 Senator Fulbright responded to Willey’s concerns by explaining that he and 
other Congressmen were forming a special committee, which would be determined to reach an 
understanding over renegotiation of the requirements involving braceros that skip their 
contracts.63 The letter from Willey and Senator Fulbright’s response highlight the close 
relationship planters had with their elected officials. It also provides evidence to support the 
argument that planters were willing to use their political influence once their profits or 
reputations were damaged. 
																																																						
60 Charles Willey to Senator William Fulbright, July 25th 1950, Fulbright Papers  
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid. 
63	Senator William Fulbright to Charles Willey, July 30th 1950, Fulbright Papers.	
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 In a letter, dated July 29th 1950, C.N. Houck, the vice-president of Miller Lumber 
Company, wrote to Senator Fulbright explaining the labor and harvest situation in Marianna, 
Arkansas. Houck says there would be a large cotton harvest that season and labor would need to 
be hired from Mexico. Houck emphasized his reasons for the shortage of labor by saying, “as 
you well know the labor on the farm is decreasing from year to year due to the increased use of 
tractors and other farm machinery. Also due to great industrial activity very little labor is 
available from the cities and towns and in addition many workers will probably be inducted into 
the armed services, so that we are now faced with a large crop and a short labor supply.”64 Houck 
also used his letter to Senator Fulbright to voice his grievances over the required bond planters 
had to pay for each bracero, complaining about the poorly negotiated bond of 1949 and the 
inability of the USIS to limit the amount of desertions by bracero workers. 
 Another letter highlighting the shortage of labor and the failure of the USIS to keep track 
of Braceros comes from Dan Felton, a merchant, planter and ginner from Felton, Arkansas. In a 
letter, dated July 29th 1950, Felton wrote Senator Fulbright voicing his concern over a shortage 
of labor. Felton complained that the large harvest yield of 1950 would need a lot of labor. Felton 
complained about the increased mechanization that was happening on the plantations and the 
increased industrial activity in the cities. He cites these problems as the reasons for a labor 
shortage in his area of the state, “due to increased mechanization we don’t have near the labor 
actually living on the farms that we had in the past, this makes us dependent to a large degree on 
labor hauled to the farm from cities and towns surrounding us, but due to increased industrial 
activity in these populated areas it is next to impossible to get the labor required to harvest our 
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crops in the fall.”65 Felton’s awareness of the impact of mechanized farm equipment and the 
effect of industrial expansion in the urban areas shows he is concerned with the amount of profit 
he will make. If he had to pay for recruitment and transportation of urban labor it would cut into 
his profit margin. His need for labor and the lack of expenses he is willing to spend makes the 
Bracero Program a perfect way for him to obtain enough labor for his harvest. Felton also 
complained about the 1949 bond agreements and the heavy penalties required if braceros were 
not returned to Mexico after their contracts have ended.  
Felton detailed three reasons he believed the bond of 1949 was unfair. One is “many 
aliens enter who are not agricultural workers and have no intention of working. They usually 
disappear or skip while en-route to the farm or soon after their arrival.” 66 Second, “many after 
their arrival at the farm hear of high wages in industrial cities or towns and leave for these jobs 
before the departure date.”67 Third, “some of them become homesick and leave.”68 Felton 
complained about the harsh penalties levied by the 1949 bond for missing or skipping braceros. 
Felton insisted that all planters felt the same way, but the labor is extremely important for the 
harvest. He ended his letter with a plea, to Senator Fulbright, to influence the United States 
Immigration Service to strike a more favorable and reasonable deal with the Mexican 
government. Senator Fulbright responded that he hoped to work with Felton and other planters to 
create a better arrangement when it came to the Bracero Program.69 This letter provides ample 
evidence on the ability of planters to use their political connections to influence negotiations of 
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66 Ibid. 
67 Ibid. 
68 Ibid. 
69	Senator William Fulbright to Dan Felton, August 3rd 1950,	Fulbright Papers.	
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the USIS. Once planters’ finances were affected by the bond agreements of 1949, they knew 
their economic power could be used to manipulate political officials. 
 In July of 1950, R.E.L “Bob” Wilson III was not comfortable with the amount of local 
labor on hand in the area of Wilson, Arkansas. It was clear to Wilson that Lee Wilson & 
Company would not be able to harvest their full acreage without the help of some type of 
government assistance. Wilson’s solution was to contact Arkansas Senator, William Fulbright. In 
a letter dated July 27th 1950, R.E.L. Wilson III voiced his concern that even with a steady supply 
of bracero labor, he had concerns about his increasing labor needs. Wilson believed “it is of the 
utmost importance that we secure Mexican National Laborers to harvest our cotton crop.”70 Later 
in the letter, Wilson complained about the unfair bond agreement negotiated between the United 
States and Mexico, he went on to say “there is no obligation on the part of the worker 
whatsoever and there is no way for the farmer to keep the worker from leaving whenever he 
wishes.”71 Wilson provided his opinion for a solution, which allowed the farmer to “be permitted 
to hold out from the worker’s wages, enough money to cover the amount of the bond posted for 
him and to refund this money to the worker when he is safely returned across the border.”72 As 
for the issue regarding off-duty accident and sickness insurance, which was also negotiated in the 
1949 bond, Wilson considered this a terrible deal because he felt it would encourage 
“absenteeism and gold-bricking.”73 In the last part of his letter, Wilson encouraged the United 
States government to set up and increase its enforcement by establishing a border patrol office in 
the Arkansas Delta. Wilson believed this would discourage braceros from skipping their 
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contracts, which costs the planter a large fee. Senator Fulbright responded to R.E.L. Wilson’s 
letter, on August 1st 1950, indicating that he was interested in the problem and would discuss the 
situation with other Congressman who have the same problems within their states.74 This letter is 
evidence of the influence planters, such as R.E.L Wilson III, had over government officials, 
especially when it came to the economic success and burden being put on the planters. This letter 
also shows how vital the Bracero Program had become to Arkansas Delta planters. It was 
Wilson’s belief that the only way he could produce his harvest was through the help of bracero 
labor, and he was willing to use his political connections to accomplish that goal.  
Another letter dated November 27th, 1959, was sent from Bob Wilson to Governor 
Faubus expressing his gratitude and appreciation to Governor Faubus for granting his request for 
Mexican labor at Lee Wilson & Company. “Please accept my thanks personally, and in behalf of 
Lee Wilson & Company, for your invaluable assistance in placing our problems before Messrs. 
McDonald and Murrell.”75 The beginning of the letter implies Wilson had a pre-existing 
relationship with the governor of Arkansas, and it seems Wilson felt comfortable that his request 
would be met. Later in the letter, Wilson again voiced his pleasure for being given the chance to 
use Mexican labor, and also highlighted the reason behind his request for braceros. “I am very 
pleased to learn that Mr. McDonald has taken the realistic and sensible attitude toward approving 
authorization of Mexican Nationals when domestic labor is obviously unavailable. Your efforts 
in our behalf are appreciated and will be remembered”76 Wilson made it clear his request would 
not have been accomplished without the impact made by Governor Faubus. This is a great 
																																																						
74	Senator William Fulbright to R.E.L. Wilson III, August 3rd 1950,	Fulbright Papers.	
75 Bob Wilson to Governor Faubus, November 27th 1959, series: 7, subseries: 2, box: 210, folder 
2. Orval Eugene Faubus Papers, Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries, 
Fayetteville 
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example of how planters used their relationship and influence over high ranking government 
officials to maintain the Bracero Program. The economic benefits presented by the program gave 
planters a reason to use their power and influence over the political elite. Another reason 
politicians were willing to grant the requests of the planter, other than their economic influence, 
was the planters inability to hire adequate numbers of domestic labor. Wilson makes it clear in 
his thank you letter to Faubus that without his help they would not be able to find domestic labor.  
After receiving Wilson’s thank you letter, Governor Faubus sent a letter acknowledging 
his appreciation to Bob Wilson and extending the opportunity for further assistance if it was 
needed. “Please let us know at any time you have problems with which we can assist.”77 This 
letter is significant because it shows that even after Faubus assisted Lee Wilson & Company he 
was still willing to use his political power to benefit the planter elite. He also provides Wilson 
with an avenue to other government officials who could help Lee Wilson & Company with any 
labor problem that might arise. “If I am not available, you can call on Mr. Jim Bland, and in his 
usual efficient manner, you can count on the problem’s being handled in a proper way, if it is at 
all possible.”78 This letter is an important source that shows how politicians were willing to 
provide assistance to planters and were even willing to point them in the right direction if they 
themselves were unavailable.  
The impact and influence planters held with the political elite in Arkansas has been well 
documented. These sources have provided substantial evidence to conclude that planters had 
influence over their economic prosperity. Unfortunately, for local labor the influence they held 
over the political elite was disastrous. In a letter, dated August 4th 1959, Earnest Dobbs wrote 
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Governor Faubus regarding the braceros being sent to Jackson County. In a handwritten letter, 
Mr. Dobbs told Governor Faubus there was enough people in Jackson County “to take care of all 
the farming without any help from Mexicans.”79 Dobbs also informed Governor Faubus that 
people in Jackson County were on the welfare rolls because they were not being offered the 
farming jobs that existed in the county. Dobbs observed that the “laboring class people put you 
in office and now we are asking for a little help, please keep the Mexicans out during cotton 
picking. If you need a petition signed just send me one I will get it signed and returned.”80 This 
plea, by Dobbs, in defense of local labor fell on deaf ears.  
In a letter, dated August 17th 1959, J.N. Lewis wrote to the administrator of the 
Employment Security Division, J.L. Bland regarding the letter from Dobbs. Lewis acknowledged 
the discontent expressed within the letter from Dobbs, but did not focus on the things Dobbs 
highlighted in his handwritten letter. Instead of focusing on the problems Dobbs informed 
Governor Faubus about, Lewis provided Bland with the type of work the Dobbs family had in 
Jackson County. In Lewis’ letter to Bland he says “neither Mr. or Mrs. Dobbs are agricultural 
workers.” He continued by saying “Mr. Dobbs will have no trouble keeping his entire group 
employed this Fall as our shortage of pickers is going to be very large.”81 This letter provides 
evidence of just how little these political officials cared about their constituents, especially when 
it came to local labor. Instead of reading Dobbs’ letter as a concerned citizen who viewed 
bracero labor to be taking jobs from his fellow citizens, who could have used the work as a way 
to get off welfare rolls, they assume all Dobbs was referencing his own job, when in fact, Dobbs 
was trying to be the voice for the local people of Jackson County. This is yet another instance 
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where the political elite were unwilling to waiver from their support for the planter elite, even at 
the expense of local labor. 
Another letter that emphasizes political favor towards the planter elite is dated November 
4th 1959, from J.L. Bland to J.M. Cleveland, a manager in the Employment Security Division of 
Blytheville, Arkansas. Bland wrote to Cleveland that the “Lee Wilson Company has presented to 
us a proposal whereby they would plant a tremendous acreage of berries and vegetables, if we 
can supply the labor.” He went on to say that “Governor Faubus and I explored this and both of 
us are inclined to go along with the proposition.”82 Five days after the above letter, J.L. Bland 
sent a letter to Governor Faubus, dated November 9th 1959. In this letter, Bland hailed the 
production of the Mexican laborers, and how these laborers helped planters of Arkansas make 
huge profits. Bland stated, “we had 40,000 Mexicans who picked more than 30 days at the low 
rate and this meant more than a million dollars to the growers.”83 This letter provides a great deal 
to the argument that planters used their economic influence to sway the political elite in favor of 
using the bracero labor because it emphasizes the economic benefit between Mexican labor and 
the cotton industry. Bland’s acknowledgment of the economic benefits provided to planters 
through the Bracero Program shows how the Arkansas Department of Labor encouraged the 
economic output of large plantations across the state. In the case of Jim Bland and the ESD, it 
was imperative that the largest planters in the state be provided the greatest and easiest avenue to 
large economic outputs. If large plantations were given the opportunity to use cheap labor, thus 
increasing their overall gains, it would make Bland’s performances as administrator at the ESD 
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seem more successful. Therefore, it became very important for Bland and his office to cater to 
the planter elite.  
After evaluating these sources, it becomes clear that the planter elite had complete control 
over political officials in Arkansas. It is evident that Arkansas politicians were willing to render 
their political actions to line the pockets of the planter elite. Planters knew their power over the 
economy could be used to manipulate and influence political officials. As long as the planters 
made it clear to politicians how important it was for them to make the most profit or save the 
most money, it became second nature for them to use their political influence as a way to 
enhance their economic profit. 
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Conclusion: 
Throughout this paper we have seen how the United States government and the planter 
elite worked together to respond to downturns in the labor supply. This paper began with the 
onset of World War II, a time when conflict all across the globe called for brave Americans to 
offer their services to defend the ideas and values of this great republic. This call to service had 
an adverse effect on the homeland and the agricultural labor situation. When the United States 
entered the conflict most able bodied men volunteered or were drafted for military service, and 
the men and women who could not take part in military action positioned themselves to provide 
for the war effort in other ways. The main effort for men and women who were not a part of the 
fighting was to offer their next greatest attribute, their labor. Even though they could not fight 
against the enemy, they could still work to build the military. During the war factories were 
transformed into military productions lines and operated entirely for military purposes. This fact 
propelled the men and women of America to move their families out of agricultural areas and 
into the industrial heartlands of the United States where they could provide a contribution to the 
war effort and earn higher wages. Unfortunately for planters and large plantations, the action 
taken by those Americans is what fueled the eventual need for immigrant labor. Since Americans 
were moving out of the agricultural areas, in particular the South, planters needed a significant 
supply of labor to keep production high and in turn contribute to the war effort in their own way.   
 Once it was understood that crops equaled food for the troops it became extremely 
important to have the largest and most productive harvests possible. Since domestic labor had 
shifted towards the industrial sector for higher wages and greater opportunity, the agricultural 
sector was very limited when it came to hiring enough domestic labor to maintain the wartime 
production levels. This fact prompted the United States government to act accordingly. As we 
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know, their solution was to acquire Mexican immigrants. At the beginning of the Bracero 
Program, the United States government maintained its priorities’ by administering the program 
in a responsible and effective manner. However, once the war ended the United States 
government began to show favoritism and a lack of control over the program. During the late 
1940s and early 1950s the terms of the Bracero Program were increasingly dictated by the 
American planter. As we have seen from documents and archival data, American farming 
operations and plantations, such as Lee Wilson & Company, were more than willing to use their 
power and influence over politicians to extend the program’s life span, ultimately, increasing 
their economic prosperity. The planters’ willingness to exploit politicians for economic gains 
signals the importance of cheap labor to planters. Not only does this exploitation underscore the 
advantage of cheap labor, but it also decreases the wages and opportunities of domestic labor. 
When a planter was able to legally hire a bracero, whom he could pay much lower wages, and 
only pay for a short period of time, it became counter-productive to hire domestic labor. The 
transition to capital intensive labor and the corresponding demise of the tenancy system played 
an important role in the attitude of planters toward local labor. Under the tenancy system, 
planters provided for their laborers year-round. Although the tenancy system imposed a heavy 
burden of debt for the laborer, it guaranteed them a place in the agricultural sector. With the 
emergence of scientific agriculture- the use of machines and chemicals- planters no longer 
needed year-round labor and their responsibilities that accompanied it. It was more expedient for 
them to use season laborers.  
 The Bracero Program was meant to be a quick fix, but it ended up becoming a very 
lucrative business, one that provided millions of jobs to Mexican workers, but also took away 
hundreds of thousands of jobs that could have been fielded by domestic workers. The Bracero 
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Program’s track record is mixed, especially in the Arkansas Delta. On the one hand, it helped 
keep production levels high and labor costs low for planters. On the other hand, it allowed 
planters to gain favorable treatment and political influence over countless government officials. 
Considering these facts, it is difficult to view the influx of Mexican immigrants we have today as 
a new phenomenon. When it comes to cheap agricultural labor, American planters continue to 
look to Mexico to supply that labor. Whether it be through government sanctioned programs, 
such as the Bracero Program, or recruiting Mexican immigrants from border towns, the planter 
elite and now the large manufacturing producers, such as Tyson Foods, will always find the most 
cost effective means of production.  
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